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Death and a Rational Justice:- A
Conversation on the Capital
Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul
Stevens
Scott Burris
(The Scene: In the dining room of the Supreme Court, Justices John
Paul and Thurgood, and William, the Chief Justice, entertain a
visiting Student of the Law.)
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Deciding Who Dies
THURGOOD. The sad and simple truth is that this Court failed in 1972.
Furman should have decided once and for all that the death penalty is
unconstitutional.'
WILLIAM. But it didn't. It decided only that executions had to stop. until
certain supposed problems were solved.' Although all the Justices in the
majority shared a discomfort with how the penalty was being adminis-
tered, each one had his own idea of how, precisely, the Constitution was
implicated, and only you and the elder William were prepared to find it
unconstitutional per se. I dissented, but it was four years later, in Gregg,
that this Court went truly wrong. The question before us was whether the
penalty was constitutional for murder. We said it was.' But then, for
some unhappy and unprincipled reason, we proceeded to claim the consti-
1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-32 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
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tutional authority to promulgate the following hopelessly impractical limi-
tations on its use: The state could not automatically kill everyone, or ran-
domly kill just anyone 4 convicted of a capital offense-some procedure
had to guide the sentencing decision in some way, 5 and had to allow con-
sideration of mitigating factors.' Suddenly we were in the business of tell-
ing states exactly how they could administer a penalty we told them was
fully constitutional.7
JOHN PAUL. Both of you oversimplify." Gregg and its companion cases
held that the penalty was a constitutional sanction for murder, but not for
every murder. 9 The problem recognized in Furman was that getting the
penalty in America was like being struck by lightning-random, freakish,
with no way to predict who would get it and no criteria for deciding who
should.10 As our brother Potter observed, "of all the people convicted of
[capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in
Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."" Furman mandated that
the sentencer's discretion be limited and guided to prevent this kind of
arbitrary and capricious action.12 The simplest way to limit discretion
would, of course, have been to make the penalty mandatory upon convic-
tion of capital crimes, but we rejected that in Woodson because of strong
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
5. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976).
6. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; see also Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 305, 358 (noting minimal requirements for valid capital sentencing under current
doctrine).
7. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983) (plurality opinion) (arguing that state
may decide to execute whomever it desires, provided she has been properly convicted of capital crime
and sentenced under procedures which suggest decision will not be so wholly arbitrary as somehow to
violate Constitution); Wainwright v. Spenkelink, 442 U.S. 901, 903 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of motion to vacate stay of execution).
8. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 951 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certio-
rari) ("Although [the constitutional questions raised by the penalty] have not been difficult for [Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Marshall, and Brennan], other Justices have found a number of these questions
sufficiently important and difficult to justify the delays associated with review. . . ."); see also Spazi-
ano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 488 n.34 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H. MELVILLE, BILLY
BUDD, SAILOR 110 (H. Hayford & M. Sealts, Jr. eds. 1962) for proposition that judges in capital
cases may feel compassion but must "strive against scruples that may tend to enervate decision").
9. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84 ("[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the
appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes
are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty
of death.") with Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295-99 (overturning statutes mandating death for all first-
degree murderers because death no longer viewed as appropriate for substantial portion of such mur-
derers). See also Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 708 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Eighth
Amendment precludes death penalty where crime did not reflect more depravity than that of "any
person guilty of murder"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 n.15 (1982) (citing precedent for need
to limit capital punishment to "worst" cases).
10. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89.
11. Id. at 188 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
12. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
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evidence that "under contemporary standards of decency death is viewed
as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted
first-degree murderers."' 3 Since the states cannot and do not execute all
murderers, it is indispensable, both morally and legally, that they have a
principled justification for executing the few they do. We therefore, of
necessity, required unique sentencing procedures in capital cases that
would ensure a rational decision on who would die. And it has worked.
4
STUDENT. Just what do you mean by "rational" here?
JP. A rational sentencing decision is one based on objective, standardized
criteria, the use of which makes the decision susceptible to review by
higher courts, and promotes consistent results in comparable cases.15 This
reads "rational" as the antonym of "arbitrary," which denotes a decision
made according to whim or caprice, under improper procedures. 6 The
sine qua non of a rational sentencing scheme is that it provide a princi-
pled way to distinguish the few cases in which the penalty is actually
imposed from the many in which it is not."
STU. Do you really mean that?
JP. Absolutely. I am convinced that the Constitution requires that "any
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on rea-
son rather than caprice or emotion."'18
13. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 296; see also Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
661, 698-99 (1983) [hereinafter Baldus] (only 17% of Georgia defendants convicted of murder sen-
tenced to death); U.S. DFPARTM:NT OF JuSTICF, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcS, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT 1984, at 5 (1986) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984] (197,830 arrests in 204,000
known homicides resulted in 2,384 death sentences); Zimring & Hawkins, Capital Punishment and
the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 953 (1985)
(executions occuring at rate of about 0.2% of homicide rate). But see Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S.
949, 956-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Greenberg, Capital Punish-
ment as a System, 91 YAI.I L.J. 908, 908-09 (1982) (attributing low number of executions to height-
ened judicial scrutiny of sentencing process).
14. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958-60 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
15. Justice Stevens nowhere provides a definition of rationality in sentencing. For some treatment
of the issue, see Barclay, 463 U.S. at 959-60 (discussing arbitrariness, caprice, consistency, and ra-
tionality); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-80 (1982) (discussing apparent elements of rational
decision); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-98 (on standards, consistency, and reviewability); see also Weis-
berg, supra note 6, at 308 (on possibility of intelligible criteria for capital sentencing). Contra
Furman, 408 U.S. at 389 (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (inevitable inconsistency
and fortuity do not "stand as an indictment either of the general functioning of juries . . or of the
integrity of jury decisions in individual [capital] cases").
16. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 27 n.116 (1980); Leff, The Leff
Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 95 YAt.E L.J. 1855, 2051 (1985) (defining "arbitrary").
17. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (quoting Furman, 408
U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)).
18. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion); Baldwin v. Alabama, 105
S. Ct. 2727, 2742 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing Barclay, 463 U.S. at 938 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting "constitutional duty" to ensure rationality); see also Weisberg, supra note 6, at
318-22 (comparing this "romantic" due process approach in capital sentencing to "classical" ap-
proach exemplified by Justice Harlan's view in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), that
standards could not be formulated).
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STU. This claim is one that I am very eager to pursue. I know that
Thurgood says no one may be executed, and William says that anyone
fairly convicted of capital murder may be executed, but knowing the posi-
tions they have taken based on the per se constitutionality of the penalty
hasn't helped me understand how the death decision is actually made
under Gregg and its progeny. And yet, executions are taking place at the
rate of one or two per month. 9 If you can convince me that you have
enforced a system that ensures that only a particularly heinous subclass of
the large class of death eligible murderers is selected for execution, I
would at least have to admit that you offer a way to reconcile values of
civilized rationality and fairness with the horror of taking life.
B. The Penalty, the Constitution and the Difference of Death
JP. I should begin with Gregg, and explain why simply finding the pen-
alty unconstitutional is not a legitimate way out. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishments as defined by society's "evolv-
ing standards of decency."'2 0 In assessing the evolution of decency in Gregg
and its companion cases, we looked to the thirty-five states that swiftly
passed new penalty statutes after Furman, at juries that continued to
hand down death sentences, and at other indicia of contemporary views on
the penalty.21 It was obvious that there had been no general moral rejec-
tion of the penalty, and my brother Thurgood, in dissent, could only sup-
port the opposite conclusion by arguing that society's moral standards had
evolved past the penalty without society's knowing it.22 Of course, the
mere fact that a penalty has popular approval does not insulate it from
constitutional scrutiny. The Eighth Amendment also requires that a pun-
ishment not be excessive,23 meaning, first, that it can't be grossly out of
proportion to the crime being punished, and second, that it has to achieve
some rational purpose that can't be served by a lesser sanction.24 Since it
is apparent that death is not a disproportionate punishment for intentional
murder, 5 the major issue was the purposes the penalty might serve; the
plurality opinion I joined in Gregg gave two. The first was retribution:
"In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
19. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, § 4 (Week in Review), at 22, col. 1 (21 people executed in 1984,
18 in 1985, and 6 in first four months of 1986); id., Aug. 27, 1986, at A20, col. 4 (three Texas
convicts executed in one week). See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984, supra note 13 (compiling
capital punishment statistics).
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
21. Id. at 179-82; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 296-99 (1976).
22. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 173.
24. Id. at 173, 182-83.
25. Id. at 187.
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particularly offensive conduct. This function ... is essential in an or-
dered society that asks citizens to rely on legal process rather than self-
help to vindicate their wrongs. "26
THUR. Evidently, the penalty is all that stands between us and frontier
justice.
27
JP. The other major purpose we noted was deterrence.
THUR. "Noted" may exaggerate the weight of your plurality's attention to
that particular purpose. You did no more than declare that legislatures
were better suited than courts to undertake the kind of fact-finding that
would determine the deterrent value of punishments.2"
STU. But today we're assuming the constitutionality of the penalty.
JP. In that case, let me explain the part of Gregg that so irks William:
why the Constitution requires more positive regulation of the death pen-
alty than of other punishments.
WILL. The Constitution doesn't demand more-in fact, one could argue
that the Eighth Amendment has nothing at all to say about a sanction,
such as death, that the Framers implicitly accepted 9-but that doesn't
stop John Paul. He has three little words he intones whenever he feels the




JP. And so it is, in ways even you cannot deny. It is irrevocable-there is
no curing a mistake. And it is a total rejection of rehabilitation as a basic
purpose of the criminal justice system. Most fundamentally, it is a nega-
tion of the executed person's humanity, the very right to have rights."1 As
one penalty supporter wrote: "When a man is hung, there is an end of
our relations with him. His execution is a way of saying, 'You are not fit
for this world, take your chance elsewhere.' "32 This means that we must
be as sure as possible not merely that a given defendant is guilty, but also
that the penalty really is a justified response to his crime. 3 I might add,
Student, that every member of this Court, even William, has written or
joined an opinion endorsing these "three little words."3 4
THUR. You've cared enough about the phrase to keep a running count in
26. Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
27. See id. at 237-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It simply defies belief to suggest that the death
penalty is necessary to prevent the American people from taking the law into their own hands.").
28. See id. at 183.
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 418-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 & n.2 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 n.3 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
32. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Stephen, Capital Punishments,
69 FRASER'S MA;AZINF 753, 763 (1864)), quoted in Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 n.3.
33. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468.
34. Id. at 468 & n.2.
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your opinions of the number of your brethren who've repeated it, but
"death is different" doesn't mean the same thing to all of us. To me, it
means only that the penalty is uniquely wrong.35
WILL. The question is not whether death is "different," John Paul, but
what that difference entails. Obviously, death is not the same as thirty
days in the pokey. That difference is one thing we may look at when we
consider the fit of a punishment to a crime-whether death is "cruel and
unusual" for shoplifting, for instance. 8 But once you decide death is not
cruel and unusual for murder, you should stop. Case closed. After all, the
whole point of it then is that it is different: more severe, more awesome.
Your claim that the difference requires some higher degree of procedural
reliability is cut from whole cloth. If the penalty is not disproportionate to
the crime-if it is a constitutional punishment-and the defendant has
been convicted in a trial in which all of his...
THUR. Or her...
WILL . . . .constitutional rights have been respected, we really ought
have nothing more to say to a state that decides to impose it.3"
STU. Let's just go ahead and assume that the Constitution requires special
scrutiny of death sentencing, which surely is the operative view on the
Court in any case. 8 That way we can finally start talking about what
that scrutiny amounts to and what it has accomplished.
II. How To GUARANTEE THAT ANY DECISION To IMPOSE THE
PENALTY "WILL BE, AND APPEAR To BE, BASED ON REASON
RATHER THAN CAPRICE AND EMOTION"
A. Guided Discretion Rises
JP. The way to rationalize sentencing, and eliminate the unbridled discre-
tion decried by Furman, is to provide the sentencer with standards to
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 240-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-44 (1984) (describing constitutional restrictions on dispro-
portionate punishments).
37. Wainright v. Spenkelink, 442 U.S. 901, 903 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
motion to vacate stay of execution); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 321-24 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); see also Coleman v. Balkeom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-63 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (excessive scrutiny of capital sentencing procedures has led to
"stalemate in the administration of Federal constitutional law"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
632-33 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing minimalist view of constitutional protections);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The prohibition of the
Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is
imposed."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 398-99 (1972) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claims of arbitrary sentencing "manifestly" fail to implicate Eighth Amendment).
38. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Eighth
Amendment may require "certain procedures designed to prevent the arbitrary imposition of capital
punishment"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-77 (1983) (discussing protections in Georgia's
sentencing system).
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guide it through the death decision. The new statutes we approved in
Gregg and subsequent cases did this. The judge and jury are provided lists
of aggravating and mitigating factors which the state, representing organ-
ized society, regards as important to the decision to impose death or not. 9
The sentencer must consider the particular circumstances of the crime and
the criminal, and evaluate them according to clearly elucidated stan-
dards.4 0 Specifically, the decision to impose death requires a sequence of
independent determinations. 41 First, a sentencer must find at least one ag-
gravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before a convicted murderer is
even eligible for death.' 2 If at least one is found, the sentencer goes on to
weigh all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine
39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1976) (plurality opinion). Thirty-seven states have capital punishment statutes. CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 1984, supra note 13, at 3. All list aggravating circumstances (or include them in
the definition of capital murder) and most list mitigating factors as well. Where mitigating circum-
stances are not statutorily provided, the sentencer is free to find any mitigating evidence the defendant
offers as justification for mercy. Similarly, many jurisdictions allow consideration of non-statutory
aggravating factors once death eligibility has been determined using the listed aggravators. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Anderson 1982); VT.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1986); Gillers, supra note 16, app. at 102-19. In some states the circumstances
track those in the Model Penal Code. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(s) (Harrison 1982) and
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft
1962). The Georgia statute approved in Gregg is typical. It provided the following aggravating
circumstances:
(1) The offense. . was committed by a person with a prior. . . conviction for a capital
felony, or . . . a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense . . was committed [during] the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or . . . burglary or arson ....
(3) The offender. . . knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense for [pecuniary gain].
(5) [The victim was a present or former] judicial officer, . . . district attorney or solicitor
[killed] during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an
agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense . . . was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense. . . was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee or fire-
man [in the line of duty].
(9) The offense . . . was committed by [an escapee from legal custody].
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing
a lawful arrest . ...
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975)).
40. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251-53.
41. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 961-63 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Smith v. North
Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056, 1056-58 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari);
Gillers, supra note 16, at 39-40.
42. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 961; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197; Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Consti-
tutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 1037, 1061
(1985).
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whether or not death is the appropriate penalty.43 The jury should have
no reasonable doubts regarding its decision."
STU. I'm still not sure I understand how, and how thoroughly, the stan-
dards guide the sentencer's discretion.
JP. They genuinely shape deliberations to prevent unbridled discretion. 45
As we wrote, "[n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the
death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines." 46
STU. "Circumscribed" would seem to imply that within the boundaries set
by the guidelines there may still be unbridled discretion.
JP. Not at all. There will always be discretion4" in the sense that a sen-
tencer uses judgment in applying controlling standards. There may even
be a slightly stronger species of discretion, the freedom to come to a deci-
sion that diverges from that which the standards would normally tend to
support-discretion to grant mercy despite a preponderance of aggravat-
ing circumstances is constitutional, even desirable. 48 But there is most cer-
tainly not the kind of discretion rejected in Furman, the discretion to
choose the standards themselves, if any, and to apply them without any
possibility of review.49 No, "guided discretion" means "controlled discre-
tion": the standards go right into the jury room to create a structure for
deliberations."
STU. The difference between your position and William's would seem to
entail a different role for guiding factors, and that's what I'm trying to get
at. You both require one aggravating circumstance to establish death eligi-
bility. I can envision a jury going down the list and seeing if any apply;
and, for the purposes of this conversation, let's assume that juries do es-
tablish death eligibility in a reliable, consistent fashion. But at that point,
the jury has done all that William asks of it: The class is narrowed. You
would have it do more. You require the jury to use the guidelines in a
rational and coherent way right through to the end of the death decision.
It's harder to imagine that working.
JP. This is how we described it in Gregg:
43. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 961; Smith, 459 U.S. at 1057-58; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193; see also
Gillers, supra note 16, app. at 102 n.* ("Generally, the sentencer is instructed to. . . 'weigh' the two
and to impose death only if the aggravating circumstances 'outweigh' the mitigating ones."); Weis-
berg, supra note 6, at 350 (jury's use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances "usually conceived
as a weighing or balancing process").
44. Smith, 459 U.S. at 1057-58.
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-93 (analogizing sentencing factors to jury instructions of law).
46. Id. at 206-07.
47. On the different senses of discretion, see generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
31-33 (1977).
48. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203.
49. Id. at 188-89.
50. Id. at 197-98; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-52, 258 (1976).
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These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of
the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer
can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the
defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide
whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's attention is directed
to the specific circumstances of the crime: Was it committed in the
course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was
it committed upon a peace officer or a judicial officer? Was it com-
mitted in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endangered
the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's attention is focused
on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: Does
he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there
any special facts about this defendant that mitigate [sic] against im-
posing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of his coopera-
tion with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime)[?]
As a result, while some jury discretion still exists, "the discretion to
be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to
produce non-discriminatory application.1
51
The guidelines were designed to shape the jury's deliberations in a posi-
tive manner, and were understood to do so. "Thus," concluded the Florida
Supreme Court, "the discretion charged in [Furman] can be controlled
and channeled until the sentencing process becomes a matter of reasoned
judgment rather than an exercise in discretion at all."52 So you see, as we
wrote in Gregg, "[n]o longer should there be 'no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.'-"3 We have made the decision rational.
STU. Not so fast. That's a fine description of a platonic jury deliberation,
but it doesn't support the proposition that you need to establish if you
want us to accept guiding circumstances as guarantors of rationality. You
have guidelines, but having led your horse to water, can you assume it is
drinking?
5 4
JP. We "assume" juries will follow instructions of law, for example.
WILL. I won't accept that from you, who like nothing better, where
"death is different," than to assume that juries won't behave. You rejected
mandatory penalty statutes in large part because, you said, too many ju-
ries would acquit defendants regarded as guilty but undeserving of
death.
55
51. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98 (footnote omitted) (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204
S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
52. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973); see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251.
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring)).
54. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 64 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 289, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory
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JP. You're wide of the mark, William. The jury misbehavior in
mandatory systems was the direct result of the jury's lack of any discretion
not to return a death sentence. Under guided discretion systems, jurors
don't have to ignore the standards to be merciful-the guiding factors, if
anything, enhance their consideration of evidence supporting mercy. 56
THUR. But for that very reason, you can't say that jurors are so thor-
oughly guided as they are by instructions of law at the trial of guilt. Such
instructions identify elements of a crime which must be found for convic-
tion; but if the jury finds those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it
must convict. Your guided jurors can rationally find all the circumstances
they want, without ever reaching a point at which the circumstances are
dispositive.
STU. Aren't the various factors assigned weights or points or something?
JP. It's not a mechanical process; it's a matter of informed judgment.
57
THUR. It's a matter of wishful thinking.
STU. Wait, give the man some rope. The problem, John Paul, is that
without indicating in some way how each factor is to be assessed, your
gtidance is incomplete. For example, a jury finds that the defendant killed
a policeman in the line of duty-one aggravating circumstance-but the
crime is mitigated by the defendant's age, sixteen. Then what?
JP. The jury decides whether that defendant deserves death for that
crime.
STU. In other words, it decides how bad it is to kill a cop, and how much
can be forgiven a minor. Unless you tell the jury something like cop-
killing counts five points and being a minor knocks off three, different
juries could hand down different sentences in identical cases.
JP. But complete guidance would mean eliminating discretion, which we
have declined to do.58
THUR. You can't eliminate discretion. That's the box you placed yourself
in with Woodson.
STU. Anyway, John Paul, you're the one trying to establish that discretion
is "controlled" right through the actual decision to impose the penalty.
schemes "may well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the penalty determination
on the particular jury's willingness to act lawlessly"); id. at 314 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (juror
violation of oath "not only consistent with the majority's hypothesis; the majority's hypothesis is bot-
tomed on its occurrence"). See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 n.8, 245-48 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (on role of jury nullification in development of capital statutes).
56. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98. But see C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 150-52 (2d ed. aug-
mented 1981) (questioning how Gregg plurality could believe jurors would manipulate mandatory but
not guided discretion statutes).
57. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973) (procedure not "mere counting process of X
number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a rea-
soned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which can be satis-
fied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present").
58. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; see supra text accompanying note 13.
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JP. You heard what we said in Gregg. The guidelines give rational shape
to the decision.
STU. We've reached a dead end, but for now we'll grant you that juries do
consistently use the circumstances they've found. The next problem is that
some of these circumstances are such that I doubt if we may speak of
"finding" them in the familiar factual sense. It appears to me that you
have two classes of aggravating circumstances. 9 Some, like "the victim
was a policeman in the line of duty," are very much like the factual ele-
ments of a crime. Even if the jury is free to weigh them as it sees fit, the
finding of them should be fairly objective. Then there are some factors
which require considerable subjectivity even in the finding. Many states
have aggravating circumstances like Georgia's, asking whether the murder
was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim," 60 or Florida's, asking whether the murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." 1
JP. The criminal law constantly requires fact-finders to use their trained
or instructed judgment in applying difficult concepts like premeditation
and recklessness in the guilt decision.
THUR. But is that good enough? After all, death is different.62
STU. Let's say there is a continuum, beginning with "A killed B," moving
through "A intentionally killed B, a policeman in the line of duty," to "A
killed B, a policeman in the line of duty, in a manner that was outra-
geously wanton and vile, showing a depraved mind." At some point on
that line, you can no longer speak of a "correct" decision, and so your
rational criteria become "pseudo-standards." You can be right or wrong
about whether A killed B, but not about whether A's mind was depraved,
because that presupposes a line that doesn't exist.63 Essentially, if the jury
"finds" depravity-and even courts have conceded that most killings will
appear heinous and vile to the average juror8 4-then it's a "fact" and the
question of rationality is begged.
THUR. And the less factual the standards, the more likely it becomes that
59. See Gillers, supra note 42, at 1063.
60. GA. CoDn- ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982).
61. Ft.A. STAr. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (Harrison 1982); see Gillers, supra note 42, at 1061-64.
62. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 290-91 (1976) (division of murder into de-
grees failed to rationalize mandatory schemes in part because of "amorphous nature of the controlling
concepts of willfullness, deliberateness, and premeditation").
63. C. BiA:K, supra note 56, at 27-28, 77-78; cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97
(1983) (citing Justice Stevens'Jurek opinion in support of proposition that prediction of defendant's
"future dangerousness" is issue of fact).
64. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) ("person of ordinary sensibility
could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhu-
man' "); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973) ("To a layman [on a jury], no capital crime
might appear to be less than heinous. ... ).
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conscious or unconscious prejudice will creep in. When you ask "How
heinous is it to kill a cop?" a juror might end up answering "How hei-
nous is it for a poor Latino to kill a middle-class white cop?" 5
JP. That kind of discrimination has yet to be proven. 6 But regardless,
courts have strictly interpreted the guidelines.6" For example, Florida de-
fined "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" as a "conscienceless or piti-
less crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim."6"
STU. It doesn't help when you ask me to imagine an efficient killer who
uses only necessary torture.
THUR. If they're so narrowly defined, why is it that heinousness is the
circumstance that juries find most often-in over 82% of Florida's capital
cases, for example?"
JP. You'd expect that, if the system narrows the pool of capital crimes to
the very worst. And the studies you refer to also show that the likelihood
of getting the penalty increases as more aggravating circumstances are
found. In Georgia, for example, 79% of death sentences are imposed on
defendants whose cases involved three or more."0
THUR. But of that group of defendants with three or more identical ag-
gravating circumstances, only 62% were sentenced to death.7 1 It's not
enough to show that defendants with several aggravating circumstances
get the penalty more often than those with one; you have to supply a
principled way to explain why so many defendants with the same circum-
stances get different sentences.
WILL. He can't. I won't say I told you so, John Paul, but our brother
65. See C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 98-102 (race and poverty likely to warp exercise of discre-
tion); Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital
Statutes, 74 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1068-98 (1983) (sentencers' behavior "reflects sys-
tematic. . . influences of race, class, and origin"); Gross, Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation
of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1275, 1277-78 (1985)
(describing evidence of racial discrimination in sentencing); cf. Turner v. Murray, 106 . Ct. 1683,
1687 (1986) ("Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing,
there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.").
66. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (fact that "white victim crime"
more likely to result in death sentence than comparable "black victim crime" not sufficient to over-
come presumption that Georgia's death sentencing process operates in constitutional manner), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
67. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201-02
(1976). But see, e.g., Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of Proportionality
Review, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1433, 1460-70 (1985) (Georgia Supreme Court has not limited
meaning in coherent or systematic way).
68. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 n.52.
69. Radelet, Rejecting the Juy: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1409, 1417-18 (1985); see also Baldus, supra note 13, at 698-99 (Georgia's "wanton and
vile" or enumerated contemporaneous offense aggravators found in about 85% of sample capital
cases); cf Liebman, supra note 67, at 1439, 1463 n.139 ("wanton and vile" sole aggravating factor in
20% of cases).
70. Baldus, supra note 13, at 699.
71. Id. at 699-703.
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Harlan did. Way back in McGautha v. California he wrote that it was
"beyond present human ability" to contrive usable standards that would
identify in advance all the salient characteristics of a death-deserving
felony.7 Your plurality's opinion in Gregg had the temerity to suggest that




But what's obviously been undermined by subsequent experience is your
romantic notion of all but perfectly consistent, rational jury decisions
through guided discretion. John Paul, you know this. It's the reason you
wrote Zant.
B. Guided Discretion Falls
STU. I don't think you've established that guided discretion allows a prin-
cipled definition of the subclass of death eligible murderers who are actu-
ally sentenced to death. Zant v. Stephens 4 makes me wonder if that re-
mains your goal. The question in the case was whether a sentence based
in part upon invalid aggravating circumstances could stand, and the an-
swer turned on whether aggravators were required to serve any function
beyond the establishment of death eligibility.75 You were dealing with the
same Georgia statute your plurality had explicated in Gregg, but your
vision of guided discretion had changed.
JP. No it hadn't. We'd always thought of guided discretion as describing
a process that begins with all killers and ends with those few murderers
actually sentenced to die. In Zant, we merely adopted Georgia's portrayal
of this process as the ascent of a four-level pyramid, in order to clarify the
role of aggravators at various points in the decision.7 ' An accused killer
starts at the pyramid's base. The trial of guilt or innocence determines
whether he or she will rise to the second level; those convicted of capital
murder go up, while those acquitted or convicted of lesser crimes like
manslaughter stay put.
STU. What discretion does the jury exercise in this first decision?
JP. The minimal discretion of the guilt decision: Have the elements of the
crime-like premeditation-been proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
STU. So the second level is made up entirely of convicted capital murder-
ers. What next?
72. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 319-20 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204-05 (1971)); see also McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207
(standards cannot "provide more than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's ...
discretion"); Weisberg, supra note 6, at 394-95 (suggesting that rigid rules may reduce reliability of
difficult moral choices by cloaking them in falsely mechanical and objective procedures).
73. 428 U.S, at 196 n.47.
74. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
75. Id. at 864.
76. Id. at 870-73.
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JP. The jury decides whether an aggravating circumstance has been
shown beyond a reasonable doubt. If it has, the murderer is death eligible
and rises to the third level.
STU. Does the jury have any discretion not to find the aggravating
circumstance?
JP. No, that's something it finds as a matter of fact.
STU. We've already discussed the limitations of treating circumstances like
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" as "facts." 7 7 But, assuming those limits
don't apply, what happens to the death eligible murderer sitting on the
third level?
JP. The jury weighs all the aggravating and mitigating factors, whether
listed by statute or not, and then decides whether to raise the murderer to
the last level, composed of the few upon whom a sentence of death is
actually passed.
STU. The jury's consideration isn't limited to the statutory aggravating
factors?
JP. No. In Georgia, other than establishing death eligibility, the finding
of aggravating circumstances "does not play any role in guiding the sen-
tencing body in the exercise of its discretion."
'
STU. Oh, I see. So, conversely, even if it has found many aggravators, a
jury doesn't have to sentence a defendant to death?
JP. Right. "There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any
given case below the [top level] and not impose death."
'79
STU. Then it must follow that the jury also has "absolute" discretion to
place a case onto the top level and impose death.
JP. Well, yes, in the sense that the jury itself draws that final line, though
it is guided in that it can only lift a defendant onto the final level if it is
justified by the totality of the evidence.80
STU. Earlier, you said that "guided" discretion meant discretion "con-
trolled" by clear, objective standards.
JP. Yes.
STU. Are you saying now that a killer climbs to the fourth level by a
process of "controlled absolute" discretion? That's a paradox. Zant held
that a sentence based in part on invalid aggravators could stand as long as
a valid one remained to establish death eligibility.81 This means that the
77. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
78. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874. See generally Gillers, supra note 16, app. at 102-19 (listing, by state,
role of statutory and non-statutory circumstances).
79. Zant, 462 U.S. at 871 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1982)
(answering certified question)).
80. Id.
81. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874-75; see also Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 55 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stay of execution vacated).
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jury's next decision, the actual sentence, is not reviewed. If the jury also
sets the final level itself, that sure sounds like absolute discretion to me,
sans control, sans guidance, sans everything.
WILL. Zant merely emphasized what we'd known since Gregg: that ag-
gravating circumstances serve principally to narrow the class of the death
eligible.
82
THUR. There is no explaining Zant as a logical successor to Gregg. It
makes an absolute mockery of everything we've done since Furman.8"
How, John Paul, can you say that this is all you meant in Gregg? Re-
member what your plurality said? "[T]he jury's attention is directed to
the specific circumstances of the crime"-and you went through the whole
list.84 Remember requiring that the state "must channel the sentencer's
discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and de-
tailed guidance' "?85 The whole point was that the actual determination
that a defendant should live or die had to be guided by clear and objective
standards, not just the threshold decision of death eligibility.8 Furman
overturned statutes that gave the jury "practically untrammeled discretion
to let an accused live or insist that he die." 87 The only difference between
this pyramid scheme and the statutes we overturned then is that the un-
bridled discretion once present in all murder cases is now limited to those
with one aggravating circumstance.88 If what you approved in Zant isn't a
system of "standardless jury discretion," I can't imagine what is.89
WILL. Let's just say that Zant marks the moment when John Paul came
around to my way of thinking.
JP. You're both wrong. The Georgia system as described in Zant is
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The aggravating circumstances rationally
distinguish Zant's case "from the many . . . in which the death penalty
may not be imposed."90
STU. Hold it. In Gregg, you were talking about distinguishing the cases in
which the penalty "is" imposed from the cases in which it "is not." '
82. Zant, 462 U.S. at 900-01 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950
(1983) (plurality opinion).
83. Zant, 462 U.S. at 910-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Barclay, 463 U.S. at 974 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (majority "utterly faithless" to prior decisions).
84. Zant, 462 U.S. at 909; see also supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
85. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 n.47), quoted
in Zant, 462 U.S. at 909.
86. Zant, 462 U.S. at 917.
87. Id. at 907 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted)).
88. Id. at 911; see also Gillers, supra note 42, at 1090 (jury's discretion "limited" only to extent
that it cannot be exercised until an aggravating circumstance is found).
89. Zant, 462 U.S. at 910 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 n.47).
90. Id. at 879.
91. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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JP. So?
STU. So, in a word, that's the problem with Zant. The distinction between
who may get the penalty and who may not is death eligibility. We've con-
ceded (for discussion) that your system draws that line in rational fashion.
The problem posed by a liberal reading of Furman and Gregg-the prob-
lem you set for yourself when we began-is to distinguish rationally be-
tween death eligible murderers who are sentenced to death and death eli-
gible murderers who are not.
JP. The guidelines promote particularized consideration of the offender
and the offense.92 Beginning with Gregg, we stressed the importance of
providing the sentencer with as much information as possible under fair
procedures.93 Once the Georgia jury has found the circumstance establish-
ing death eligibility, the system allows it to consider all the relevant
factors.
STU. It appears, John Paul, to allow them to consider all factors period,
including things you say it oughtn't, like race."' But even were it other-
wise, ensuring that a jury will examine a problem closely does not provide
standards by which it may distinguish rationally between identically situ-
ated murderers, only some of whom may properly be executed.
WILL. The premise of a highly individualized process is that no two
crimes and criminals are alike.95 It follows that there is no speaking of
"identically situated murderers."9"
JP. That's nihilistic. Taking that position would mean there never could
be standards.
9 7
WILL. There's no pleasing this man.
STU. If, John Paul, you were arguing that the procedures now in place
make the jury less arbitrary than it was before Furman, perhaps you
could make a case. You might even be able to convince a lot of people of
William's persuasion that virtually no one ends up in the death eligible
class whom it would be capricious to execute. But if that's not good
enough for you, you must provide some criterion that governs the actual
decision to impose death.
JP. All right, I think I can do that.
92. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.
93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189-90, 204.
94. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
95. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1981); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion).
96. Gillers, supra note 16, at 26-30.
97. See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 357-58 (Stevens distressed by Rehnquist's "nihilism" in
Zant).
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C. Spaziano v. Florida: Coup de Grace
JP. In Spaziano v. Florida,98 I dissented from an opinion upholding
Florida's unique system of advisory jury verdicts, under which a judge
may impose final sentence of life or death regardless of the jury's chosen
sentence."9 The reason for my vote was simple; in a way, perhaps I was
shedding some of the rationalizations that had crept into the doctrine of
rational sentencing. The question of whether the penalty is the appropri-
ate punishment in response to the particular circumstances of the case
depends on the degree to which a death eligible defendant deserves retri-
bution. 00 "Thus . . .capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethi-
cal judgment-an assessment of ... the 'moral guilt' of the defend-
ant."101 Since it is "ultimately understood only as an expression of the
community's outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral enti-
tlement to live-I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response
can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by
a jury rather than by a single governmental official." ' 2
STU. But just why can't judges pass on this "moral entitlement" we call
life?
JP. A judge can't represent a community's values-can't maintain the link
"between contemporary community values and the penal system ...
without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety' " 1 3-in the way a jury can. And, because it is the product of outrage,
death "is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law
as judges normally understand such rules."10
STU. But all through this conversation you've been arguing that death can
be prescribed by rules of law. What else is guided discretion? Outrage
sounds more like emotion (if not caprice) than reason. How does it supply
an objective criterion for distinguishing those who die from those who
don't?
JP. Those sentenced to death are the ones who spark the jury's outrage. 1
0 5
STU. Why does Joe deserve the ultimate retribution? Because the jury
98. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
99. Id. at 470-71.
100. Id. at 480-81.
101. Id. at 481 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982)).
102. Id. at 469 (footnote omitted), quoted in Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 708-09 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) and Baldwin v. Alabama, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 2739 n.1 (1985) (same).
103. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)), quoted in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984).
104. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468-69.
105. See id. at 489-90.
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said so. Why did the jury say so? Because Joe deserves the ultimate retri-
bution. It's the sparking of the outrage you need to rationalize.
JP. But here, at last, McGautha0 6 is on my side. Our brother Harlan
noted that capital sentencing was premised on the belief "that jurors con-
fronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fel-
low human will act with due regard for the consequences of their deci-
sion."' 10 7 We recently observed that this sense of awesome responsibility
has allowed us to see discretion as compatible with, even indispensable to,
"the Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' "108 Jurors are
informed by the statutory factors and guided, one could say, by a sort of
"intuitive moral rationality." 0 9
STU. So the principled standard is, "This killer makes us mad"?
JP. I'll admit that outrage doesn't exactly square with my initial descrip-
tion of a rational sentencing criterion. But outrage is a proper response, as
long as retribution is a rational purpose of punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 10 By identifying those whose acts and character convince a
cross section of the community that their acts deserve the ultimate sanc-
tion,-it supplies a principled way to distinguish between the merely death
eligible and the death sentenced.
STU. We've allowed that retribution is a rational purpose. We'll even
grant you that your juries gravely-dispassionately? coolly?-assess their
own outrage. You've ended up defining guided discretion as the use of
guidelines which, although they are not binding after death eligibility, and
do not begin to cover the whole range of outrageous acts, 1 ' do in some
fashion tell a jury what it may get steamed about. Is that really good
enough to ensure that any decision to impose the penalty "be, and appear
to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion"? 1 2
D. Post-Mortem
STU. I think you must give it up. You still write of "the sort of considered
community judgment the Court has approved in the past,"'1 3 but by bas-
ing the decision on outrage you've left the world of objective standards.
You retreat past Gregg, past Furman, perhaps even past McGautha. It
106. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); see supra text accompanying note 72.
107. 402 U.S. at 208.
108. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1985) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
109. Weisberg, supra note 6, at 312.
110. See supra text accompanying note 26.
111. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207; C. BLACK, supra note 56, at 151-55.
112. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion).
113. Baldwin v. Alabama, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 2740 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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may be quite realistic to say that the decision to impose death is ultimately
emotional, but it shreds your vision of rationally applied standards. It may
force you to adopt William's position."1 4 (Although even seeing the ag-
gravators as a narrowing device for death eligibility, I find it hard to pic-
ture a jury which coolly decides whether an aggravator has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt and then gets outraged.)
JP. The problem is that the trial just couldn't do the job alone-but I
never really asked it to. This conversation has been skewed because we
haven't talked about half the equation, appellate review. The thrust was
always that the system as a whole achieve rationality, and I still think the
system as a whole can provide a principled way of distinguishing between
the death eligibles who do and do not actually get the penalty.1 15 After
Zant and Spaziano, I no longer seek that rationality in the decision to
impose death at trial. Instead, I regard the trial decision as testing the
retributive utility of the sentence, and rely on the cooler-headed process of
appellate review to ensure that the jury's decision, despite its emotional
basis, makes rational sense.
III. THE MEANING OF "MEANINGFUL": AN APPEAL TO APPEAL
1 1 6
STU. You have not been able to provide a principled way of determining
why those who commit comparable crimes do not get comparable
sentences. In Spaziano, you supplied a simple reason for this failure:
Turning your Gardner dictum on its head, you said the decision to im-
pose death is based on emotion-to wit, outrage-rather than reason.
Now you are apparently going to argue that outrage is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the imposition of the penalty, solely within the
province of the jury to establish. Reason is still required, but it is to be
understood as coming exclusively from the process of review.
JP. Without insisting on any particular appellate procedures, I've always
felt "that some form of meaningful appellate review is an essential safe-
guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death
sentences." 17
THUR. You tell us of what the review is made; we'll tell you if it's
meaningful.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 72-73.
115. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
253 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 206-07 (1976); Goodpaster, Judicial Review of
Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786, 789 (1983).
116. Justice Stevens has not defined "meaningful appellate review." This position is attributed to
him by inference. On the role of review in capital cases, see generally Dix, Appellate Review of the
Decision To Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97, 108, 123-35 (1979).
117. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 59 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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STU. First we need a clearer characterization of the posture of capital
review. I understand that, formally, the trial sentence is presumptively
correct, and the appellate court reviews to correct error."18 Such mere suf-
ficiency testing can't be what you mean by "meaningful" review, since
there is no rationality to "review" in a nonrational decision. 9 I presume,
then, that "meaningful" review is independent not just in the sense that it
is carried out by a different court, but also in the sense that it involves a
de novo sentencing process, in which the jury's decision is regarded only
as an indicator of outrage.
JP. I'm not convinced that de novo sentencing is necessary. Execution
normally takes place only after a direct appeal, a clemency hearing, and
one or more rounds of state and federal collateral review. 20 Obviously,
the selection is not rational merely because hearings are numerous, but
there is a sense that a fair, thorough process will eventually yield correct
results. 2 '
STU. The problem is not whether enough people pay enough attention to
the case, but whether anyone applies rational criteria to the ultimate
death decision.
THUR. It gets worse: This whole idea of serial review by successive courts
diffuses responsibility. When everyone believes that someone else has the
ultimate authority, there is an unacceptable risk that no one will take
personally the awesome responsibility for determining sentence.
22
WILL. The ultimate objection is that this theory would require us to treat
habeas corpus proceedings and certiorari to this Court as matters of right.
We'd be admitting that it takes our judicial system several tries to reach
the proper result, and we'd be institutionalizing the current penalty stale-
mate. Despite your passion for review, John Paul, even you have never
suggested going this far.'
23
JP. All right, then, what if I say appellate courts do carry out de novo
sentencing?
118. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2640-41 (1985) (noting that "most appellate courts
review sentencing determinations with a presumption of correctness").
119. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 912 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (appellate court cannot review basis
of jury's decision where aggravating circumstances played only threshold role).
120. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
121. Cf Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 67 n.16
(1985) (noting this "belief (hope?)"). But cf. Lawyers Shunning Death Row Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 1986, at Al, col. I (reporting serious shortage of lawyers for death row collateral appeals).
122. Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2640-42; Greenberg, supra note 13, at 927.
123. See Coleman, 451 U.S. at 950-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (suggesting
Court would reduce penalty supervision as major constitutional issues were settled). For Justice Ste-
vens' views in Court opinions limiting habeas corpus, see, for example, Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S.
200, 207 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari and stay of execution); Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 906 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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THUR. I'd say they don't,124 and they can't. Appellate courts are wholly
unsuited to decide sentence in the first instance. Without face to face con-
tact with the defendant and witnesses, it is impossible to form any reliable
view on the appropriateness of death or the grounds for mercy.
1 25
STU. I'm willing to grant you, for argument's sake, that appellate courts
may carry out de novo review of capital sentences. I'm not sure this helps
you. What does this de novo process entail?
JP. An appellate court will consider some version of the following ques-
tions: (1) What aggravating and mitigating factors are supported by the
evidence? (2) Was the decision to impose the penalty arbitrarily or capri-
ciously made? and (3) Was the sentence of death disproportionate com-
pared with sentences imposed for similar crimes?12
STU. The first question is of no help. Its answer merely tells the court
whether or not the defendant is death eligible. If she is, identifying the
aggravating and mitigating factors present in the case does not determine
whether or not she should actually be sentenced to death. The second
question could mean either of two things to you, after Spaziano. One is
that the jury arbitrarily imposed death without being properly outraged.
Besides suggesting an objective standard of outrage-a paradox akin to
controlled absolute discretion-it doesn't fit the de novo model. Instead, I
think we have to interpret arbitrary and capricious to mean that the jury
was outraged but, viewed by whatever rational standards you plan to of-
fer, death was not the proper sentence. To know this, of course, the appel-
late judge has to decide what sentence is proper, a decision you wouldn't
allow a trial judge to make.
JP. The trial judge couldn't make the outrage decision and the appellate
judge doesn't need to.
STU. Okay, so the appellate judge takes it as given that the jury was out-
raged, and knows what aggravators and mitigators apply. How does she
choose a sentence? What standards does she apply?
JP. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
THUR. Which aren't weighted or ranked according to any rule of law, and
which state courts have not been terribly clear or consistent in
explicating.
1 27
124. See Gillers, supra note 42, at 1091 n.360; Liebman, supra note 67, at 1464 ("[T]he Georgia
court . ..appears to do less than a truly 'independent assessment' of the evidence, preferring to
affirm the conclusion of the jury in the language of the legislature.").
125. Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2639-40.
126. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-70 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251
(1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (plurality opinion); Good-
paster, supra note 115, at 790-91.
127. See supra- notes 62-64 and acompanying text; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,
974 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (cursory or unclear analysis in lower court opinion does not
justify reversal); id. at 990 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (fact that appellate court does its job "some of
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Sru. You're still asking how bad it is to kill a cop.12 You've moved the
guided discretion problem without solving it.
JP. There is still the third question, comparative proportionality review.
This test is definitely empirical and objective. 29 The court compares all
past murder cases with the case before it to determine if the sentence is
excessive. If a certain kind of murder rarely or never draws a death sen-
tence, the court may infer that such a sentence would offend evolving stan-
dards of decency.130 That seems to me to be a pretty objective standard of
outrage.
THUR. It doesn't happen that way, though. Any claim that courts look at
"all" murder cases is hyperbole. 1 Since they actually look at only a few
cases, the crucial issue is how courts select '!similar" cases to compare.
1 32
They cannot use statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, because for
every combination there are substantial numbers of both life and death
sentences.1 3 An extremely rigorous and systematic analytical approach,
based on distinguishing elements of the crime whether statutorily noted or
not, might work. 184 That, however, is pretty hard work, and what courts
doing proportionality review have actually done is adopt a standardless,
anecdotal categorization of "similar" cases drawn from their own past
capital docket. This means, among other things, that the sample will not
include comparable cases which resulted in life sentences.' 35 Ultimately,
you have to face hard truths: State high courts have rarely overturned
sentences on proportionality grounds-indeed, some courts have never
done it 13 -and, since Pulley, we don't even require them to try.
1 37
STU. But even if Thurgood's objections were answered, comparative pro-
portionality is neither a source of rational standards nor even necessarily
probative of rationality. What it tells you is the statistical distribution of
jury outrage across the range of fact patterns. Since we have not yet estab-
lished the rationality of the death sentences in any one of those cases, we
cannot claim to have done so simply because we have differentiated among
them. When you reverse a sentence on proportionality grounds, it's not
because the decision was irrational-though it might have been-but be-
the time" in capital cases not good enough).
128. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
129. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 167 & n.10.
130. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250-51; Gregg, 428
U.S. at 198.
131. See, e.g., Blanco v. Florida, 452 So. 2d 520, 526 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181
(1985); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 167 n.10.
132. Baldus, supra note 13, at 669.
133. Id. at 753.
134. See generally Baldus, supra note 13 (outlining effective selection method).
135. See id. at 728-30; Liebman, supra note 67, at 1457-58.
136. Baldus, supra note 13, at 728-30.
137. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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cause it is out of keeping with evolving standards of outrage. Similarly,
even if a certain crime always outrages a jury, that cannot tell you that
the decision in any one of those cases was rational; rationality is precisely
what you are trying to demonstrate. Indeed, you can imagine (and if you
don't care to imagine, read about it in the Federal Reporter 38 ) that some
irrational components, like the victim's race, might consistently skew jury
decisions.
JP. There is still the requirement of particularized consideration, on re-
view as at trial. 139
STU. But on review as at trial, even the most exacting assessment of an
offender and offense doesn't provide standards for the death decision. Even
after all the information is assembled and arranged and counted and com-
pared and contrasted and weighed, the question remains, by what princi-
pled standards will the judge pass a sentence of life or death, and how will
she distinguish this defendant from the many comparable defendants who
received the other sentence?
JP. Even a student of the law, allowed the luxury of judgment without its
responsibilities, must accept that real judges are required to exercise dis-
cretion-in short, to judge. Finally, even the most theoretically pure rules
are neither self-explanatory nor self-applying. 14 0 I approach the decision
to impose the penalty as Justice Frankfurter approached the definition of
due process:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law
for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through
centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,
"due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of
any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between
man and man, and more particularly between the individual and
government, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the
past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith which we profess.141
You cannot expect-you surely cannot even desire-that this most grave
138. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907-17 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986); see supra note 65. See generally
CAPIrAL PUNISHMEN'r 1984, supra note 13 (compiling death penalty statistics by race).
139. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-79 (1983).
140. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-19
(1984) (discussing indeterminacy of legal rules); Yablon, Law and Metaphysics (Book Review), 96
YALE L.J. 613 (1987) (same).
141. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), quoted in Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331, 333 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (summary citation for contempt by state legislature does not violate due process clause),
rev'd, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
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of sanctions be imposed by judges dispassionately weighing a few specified
factors according to an inflexible system on the scales of blind justice. We
had better be bringing quite a bit more than that to bear on this tragic
decision. At some point, to distinguish properly those who are killed from
those who are spared, someone must consider their culpability as broadly
as possible, considering our laws, our national values, our reason and our
duty. That's what judges are trained for. It's our job.
14
1
STU. That's it? Judges personify rational standards? "Meaningful appel-
late review" is review by an appellate judge?
JP. Well, if you won't trust judges to exercise discretion, you're not say-
ing that the penalty is irrational, you're saying it's impossible.
WILL. & THUR. Exactly.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE END
STU. It won't work, John Paul. You justify the regulated penalty as a
means of punishing the worst, but the worst are none other than those
who are killed. Your guiding standards do not guide; in fact, it is quite
possible that those identified by the current system as the "worst" are
those already identified by a prejudiced society as the "ugly," the "alien"
or the "despised." Maybe effective guidance is impossible, and maybe not,
but it is hard to understand your Spaziano dissent as anything other than
an exhausted confession of failure. After you say the decision is a reflexive
reaction to outrage, what is left to guide?
JP. I set myself a difficult task, but what were the alternatives? I couldn't
avoid the conclusion that the penalty was constitutional for heinous kill-
ers, yet, unlike some Justices, I could not reject the assertion that the
penalty was being imposed on "only a random assortment of pariahs. 1 43
That left us no choice but to promote standards that would guide the
decision away from the kind of considerations that led to random-or
prejudiced-selection, and toward unbiased and consistent identification of
the worst, most deserving murderers. If guided discretion hasn't worked, it
is not necessarily because it was a bad idea. For one thing, there was too
much political maneuvering. I tried to be rational, but Thurgood and
William wouldn't even be reasonable. I am held to an impossibly high
standard of rationality, but undercut at every step. Thurgood keeps re-
minding us with formulaic citations to his abolitionist opinions that he
142. For evidence that appellate judges do not bring a special seriousness to the death process, and
may even bring a special haste, see Goodpaster, supra note 115, at 794 & n.64; Liebman, supra note
67; Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 913 (1983); Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Pen-
alty Cases in the Federal Courts, 95 YALE L.J. 349, 368-70 (1985).
143. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388-89 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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doesn't really accept Gregg."" And William still wants to overturn
Furman, reading our cases so narrowly he nearly strangles them.145 We
were never pulling together.
STU. The intense passions the penalty arouse have certainly complicated
your task, but your decision somehow to excise them from the application
of the penalty was the tragic flaw in your endeavor. Spaziano must have
been a catharsis.
JP. So what do you recommend I do next? I could disown this entire
discussion merely by holding to what I said in Zant: All I ever required
was that the class be narrowed, that consideration be particularized, and
that some review occur.
WILL. We'd be in agreement, then; there is nothing either unconstitu-
tional or irrational about executing everyone, anyone, or no one whom a
jury designates as death eligible.
THUR. It would make your ringing call for rationality in Gardnera
4
pretty hard to explain-but what of it? It was only dictum, right?
STU. It would be an odd step for you, John Paul. If you give up on
eliminating absolute discretion, and concede that "the worst" is a broad
enough category to encompass any death eligible mu'rderer, you lose the
basis for the crucial constitutional distinction your plurality drew between
the arbitrariness condemned in Furman and the rationality proclaimed in
Gregg and Woodson.
147
JP. I could also join Thurgood, and conclude that the penalty is unconsti-
tutional. Not, of course, because it offends common decency in and of it-
self, but rather because it cannot be applied without arbitrariness and
caprice.
WILL. I frankly don't see you as a born-again abolitionist.
STU. But it would be a reasonable step if you felt unwilling to risk a
penalty scattered randomly on pariahs.
JP. Or I could keep trying to foster effective guidelines. It still seems to
me perfectly reasonable-unimpeachable-to recognize that, while society
cannot kill anyone it likes, courts cannot refuse society's manifest desire to
kill a carefully selected few. There must be a principled way to identify
them, and states can be required to find it. Of course, it would mean
voting with Thurgood until they do.
144. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1015 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 646 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 619
(1978) (same).
145. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 436 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 959-60 (1983) (same).
146. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion); see supra text accompany-
ing note 18.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
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STU. But there is one course you should not take. You can't go on as you
have. If you've given up on Gardner, if you aren't sure that any decision
to impose death must be and appear to be based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion, then you have to say so. Thurgood and William, at
least, are straightforward. Now and then Thurgood finds himself explain-
ing the proper way to administer a penalty statute he'd actually prefer to
see overturned, 4" but one knows he is only doing it to stop what he would
consider a state murder. And William, well, he's got enough of a majority
now that he doesn't have to bend much with the winds of expediency. But
you, unfortunately, sow confusion. Your opinion for the Court in Zant is
a good example-constructed of William's holding and your rationalia
about rationality.' 49 You, more than any of the others, have argued that
we kill the carefully selected worst, and it's an attractive position for
many people. Who knows how many, lawyers and judges among them,
believe that that's what happens. Now you must admit it isn't so. William
may be right that the People are by and large satisfied with the penalty as
it is. And Thurgood may be wrong that they would not want it if they
knew how it really worked. But they have a right to know-indeed, if you
are sensibly to consider their values in applying the Eighth Amendment,
they must know-the nature of the choice.
148. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (prosecutor's suggestion that real
sentencing authority resided elsewhere prevented jury from properly weighing sentence).
149. See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 347-54.
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